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Abstract
The relation between probabilistic and explanatory reasoning is a
classical topic in philosophy of science. Most philosophical analyses
are concerned with the compatibility of Inference to the Best Expla-
nation (IBE) with probabilistic, Bayesian inference, and the impact
of explanatory considerations on the assignment of subjective prob-
abilities (Van Fraassen 1989; Okasha 2000; Lipton 2004). This paper
reverses the question and asks how causal and explanatory consid-
erations are affected by probabilistic information. We investigate (i)
how probabilistic information determines the explanatory value of a
hypothesis, and (ii) in which sense folk explanatory practice can be
said to be rational. Our study identifies three main factors in reason-
ing about a (potentially) explanatory hypothesis: cognitive salience,
rational acceptability and logical entailment. This corresponds well
to the variety of philosophical accounts of explanation. Moreover, we
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show that these factors are highly sensitive to manipulations of prob-
abilistic information. This finding suggests that probabilistic reason-
ing is a crucial part of explanatory inferences, and it motivates new
avenues of research in the debate about Inference to the Best Expla-
nation and probabilistic measures of explanatory power.
2
1 Introduction
The relationship between probabilistic and explanatory reasoning is a cen-
tral topic of the epistemology of science and of the psychology of expla-
nation. It is first touched upon in the inductive-statistical model of ex-
planation by Carl G. Hempel (1965) and it has been developed further by
writers such as Wesley Salmon (1971/84) and Peter Railton (1979). Their
models attempt to capture explanatory relationships in terms of statistical
dependencies between explanans and explanandum. In the last decades,
however, Inference of the Best Explanation (IBE) and its compatibility with
probabilistic reasoning have become the focus of the philosophical debate
(Harman 1965; Van Fraassen 1989; Lipton 2004). The crucial question is
whether inferring to the hypothesis with the highest explanatory power,
or the optimal combination of explanatory virtues, can be defended as a
rational form of inference, if “rational” is explicated in the probabilistic,
Bayesian way (e.g., Oaksford and Chater 2007; Hartmann and Sprenger
2010). More precisely, it is debated whether Inference to the Best Explana-
tion (IBE) contradicts the Bayesian rule of conditionalization, or whether
IBE can be interpreted as a distinctive rule of inference that is not only
coherent with, but also supplements, Bayesian inference.
Van Fraassen (1989, ch. 7) contends that IBE either amounts to Bayesian
conditionalization, thereby being redundant as a rule of inference, or de-
viates from it, thereby being probabilistically incoherent. If IBE deviates
from Bayesian inference, by assigning a confirmatory role to explanatory
considerations, then IBE is probabilistic incoherent, on the grounds of dy-
namic Dutch book arguments (Lewis 1999). In other words, the betting
odds implied by the beliefs of an agent who assigns a probabilistic bonus
to good explanations would allow for a system of bets where he or she can
only lose. Therefore, if IBE is probabilistically incoherent, it is irrational to
follow it. If, on the other hand, IBE always agrees with Bayesian inference,
it is unclear whether this rule of inference has independent epistemic sig-
nificance, or whether it is just redundant with respect to Conditionaliza-
tion. The upshot is that IBE cannot be both a distinctive rule of inference
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and rational.
Recently, philosophers of science have tried to sketch a more sophisti-
cated picture of the interplay between probabilistic and explanatory rea-
soning. In particular, the idea that explanatory virtues boost the posterior
probability of scientific hypotheses beyond the value they receive from
Bayesian conditionalization is rejected as too simplistic. For example, Lip-
ton (2001, 2004) argues that IBE may give a good descriptive account of our
inferential practices, even if it fails to accomplish the normative ideal of
probabilistic coherence. Many popular reasoning schemes are at odds
with the axioms of probability, but they can be a useful heuristics for
probabilistic inferences in real life (e.g., Schupbach 2011a). Perhaps IBE
can play such an intermediate role between people’s actual reasoning and
the way they would reason if they were perfectly rational. In that sense,
IBE could possess independent significance as a heuristic for probabilistic
inference.
In an even more reconciliatory mood, Lipton suggests that explana-
tory value may help to determine the prior probability and/or the like-
lihood of the explanatory hypothesis on the phenomenon of interest
(see also Okasha 2000; McGrew 2003; Weisberg 2009). In this view, IBE
should not be construed just as an inference to the explanation with the
highest posterior probability—then, there would be no need for a the-
ory of explanatory inference—, but explanatory judgments should pro-
vide constraints on the ingredients that enter the Bayesian cooking recipe
p(H|E) = p(H) p(E|H) / p(E) (Bayes’ Theorem). Instead of being a heuris-
tic for probabilistic inference, explanatory value guides such inferences. For
example, explanatory virtues such as general scope, simplicity or unifica-
tion will positively affect the prior of a hypothesis H, while others, such
as making the phenomenon E cognitively intelligible, will raise the like-
lihood of H on E, p(E|H) (Lipton 2004, 113). IBE would then not only
be compatible with, but actively supplement Bayesian Conditionalization.
Henderson (2014) even proposes that IBE emerges from Bayesianism rather
than being a constraint on Bayesian inference.
In Lipton’s account, a special role is assigned to “lovely” explanations:
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these are explanations “that would, if correct, be the most explanatory or
provide the most understanding” (Lipton 2004, 59–60). Explanatory value
is thus tightly connected to inspiring understanding in an individual rea-
soner (cf. De Regt and Dieks 2005). Accounts of explanation that stress the
cognitive value of good explanations also tend to stress the link between
understanding, causality and mechanisms—a topic that has recently re-
ceived much attention with respect to explanation in the special sciences,
including biology, psychology, economics, and so on (Machamer, Craver
and Darden 2000; Woodward 2003; Strevens 2008). Notably, even the
literature on probabilistic causation stresses that successful explanations
presuppose a causal link between explanans and explanandum (Halpern
and Pearl 2005).
Two questions which these debates have not fully elucidated are (i)
how probabilistic considerations are in themselves explanatorily relevant
and (ii) whether a powerful explanation should make the explanandum
more expected. This latter idea actually goes back to Charles Saunders
Peirce, who identified the explanatory power of a hypothesis with its
ability to render an otherwise “surprising fact” as a “matter of course”
(Peirce 1931-1935, Section 5.189). If this is correct, then a powerful explana-
tion should at least raise the subjective expectedness of the explanandum,
which suggests an analysis of explanatory power in probabilistic terms,
such as conducted recently by McGrew (2003), Schupbach and Sprenger
(2011) and Crupi and Tentori (2012). See Popper (1934/2002) and Good
(1960) for early precursors.
In the light of the philosophical debates just outlined, the present pa-
per contributes to the literature by investigating experimentally whether
and under which circumstances judgments of explanatory power are asso-
ciated with probabilistic characteristics of the potential explanation. This
investigation gives us a nuanced and empirically informed assessment of
the hypotheses that IBE is coherent with actual probabilistic reasoning,
and that explanatory power is bound up with understanding.
In particular, we constructed various vignettes where experimental
participants are given information about the priors and likelihoods of a
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potential explanatory hypothesis and are asked to make judgments on its
explanatory power, posterior probability and acceptability, as well as on
its logical, causal and cognitive relation to the explanandum. Causal infor-
mation was kept sparse in order to be able to isolate the impact of prob-
abilistic factors on explanatory judgment. By eliciting these judgments,
we sought to elucidate how these concepts cluster together, identifying a
small set of factors that accounted for most of the variation in the partic-
ipants’ judgments. Overall, our results show that explanatory judgments
are largely sensitive to subtle changes in the probabilistic setting, under-
writing the efficacy of our experimental manipulations.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys
the relevant empirical literature. Section 3 presents our experiment and
Section 4 our results. Finally, Section 5 puts the results into a broader
philosophical perspective and discusses, inter alia, the implications for
quantitative approaches to explanatory power and broader consequences
for theories of explanatory reasoning.
2 Empirical Research on Explanatory Reasoning
Empirical research in cognitive and developmental psychology has started
to uncover some of the properties and mechanisms of explanatory rea-
soning. In particular, explanation has been shown to be closely related to
confirmation; explanatory considerations can contribute to making some
hypotheses more credible. Koehler (1991), for example, reviewed much
of the work on how explanation influences subjective probabilities, and
argued that merely focusing on a hypothesis as if it were the true explana-
tion of some observed data is sufficient to boost the subjective probability
assigned to that hypothesis. Explanation has also been demonstrated to
influence how probabilities are assigned to one proposition in the light of
another. Sloman (1994) found that a proposition boosted the probability
assigned to another proposition if they shared an explanation.
Furthermore, there is evidence that epistemic virtues such as the sim-
plicity, coherence, or breadth of a potentially explanatory hypothesis can
6
influence its perceived probability. Lombrozo (2007), for example, found
that experimental participants rely on the simplicity of a potentially ex-
planatory hypothesis as a cue commensurate to base-rate information in
the face of probabilistic uncertainty (on how coherence considerations can
impact explanation see, e.g., Thagard (1989)).
Relatively little empirical research has focused on the link between
explanatory value and understanding. Available results points to the cog-
nitive dangers of putting too much weight on the sense of understanding
that certain explanations can induce. For example, there is evidence that
people tend to overestimate the depth of their own explanatory under-
standing. Rozenblit and Keil (2002) called this phenomenon “illusion of
explanatory depth”, and they demonstrated that this illusion is signifi-
cantly stronger for explanatory knowledge relative to other knowledge
domains (see also Keil 2006). Naturalistically minded philosophers of
explanation such as J.D. Trout (2002, 2007) argue that a sense of under-
standing is indeed frequently deceptive, induced by overconfidence and
hindsight bias rather than by explanatory power, and in any case not a
good indicator for a valuable explanation.
These empirical results are broadly in line with Lipton’s (2004) account
of the relationship between IBE and Bayesian inference: explanatory con-
siderations guide the assignments of subjective probabilities to proposi-
tions, and inferences to lovely explanations are, in some sense, bound up
with understanding. However, like its counterpart in philosophy of sci-
ence, the relevant psychological literature has mainly been concerned with
the question of how probability judgments are informed by explanatory
considerations, neglecting the question of how probabilistic and logical
information can themselves influence explanatory judgements (see also
Keil and Wilson 2000; Keil 2006; Lombrozo 2011, 2012). An answer to
this latter question will be relevant to better elucidate the relationships
between probabilistic and explanatory reasoning, explanatory value and
understanding, as well as to assess whether or not IBE is probabilistically
coherent. Furthermore, even if explanation, confirmation and acceptance
are closely related in IBE, it is far from obvious whether they correspond
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to distinct concepts in our psychology that tap onto different reasoning ca-
pacities. What is more, it is far from obvious whether these three concepts
in our psychology—if they exist—agree with their philosophical explica-
tions (Crupi et al. 2007; Schupbach 2011b; Crupi 2012).
3 Experiment and Methods
Our experiment consisted of an online questionnaire, conducted via the
LimeSurvey environment. The participants for our study were under-
graduate students of Tilburg University from the School of Economics and
Management and the School of Social and Behavioral Sciences. They were
recruited via emails from a teacher of one of their classes. Incentives were
provided in terms of points for the final exam and a prize lottery.
The respondents of the survey were 744 students, of which 671 com-
pleted the questionnaire (383 male, Mage = 21.5 (SD = 2.3)). They were
randomly assigned to one of the 12 versions of an experimental vignette.
Each participant received exactly one vignette.
Design and Material
Participants were presented with an experimental vignette where two pos-
sible events were related to two possible explanations for that event:
Vignette 1: There are two urns on the table. Urn A contains 67%
white and 33% black balls, Urn B contains only white balls. One
of these urns is selected. You don’t know which urn is selected, but
you know that the chance that Urn A is selected is 25%, and that the
chance that Urn B is selected is 75%. From the selected urn a white
ball is taken at random.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Urn A has been chosen.
The participants were then asked to assess the following seven items (the
construct names in italics were not provided to the participants) on a Likert
scale ranking from 1 (“do not agree at all”) to 7 (“fully agree”):
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• (Logical Implication) The hypothesis logically implies that a white ball
has been taken out.
• (Causality) The hypothesis specifies the cause that a white ball has
been taken out.
• (Confirmation) The hypothesis is confirmed by a white ball has been
taken out.
• (Posterior Probability) The hypothesis is probable given that a white
ball has been taken out.
• (Explanatory Power) The hypothesis explains that a white ball has
been taken out.
• (Understanding) The hypothesis provides understanding why a white
ball has been taken out.
• (Truth) The hypothesis is true.
The choice of these seven items was motivated by the crucial role that
concepts such as logical implication, causality and confirmation play in
reasoning about candidate explanations, according to different philosoph-
ical accounts of explanatory value.
After filling in this questionnaire, the participants could explain the
way they made their judgments, and we collected some demographic data.
This vignette was, in a between-subjects design, varied in three dimen-
sions, corresponding to three main independent variables:
1. Likelihood: the choice of the evidence (white or black ball) which
leads to a high or a low likelihood of the hypothesis on the evidence;
2. Target Hypothesis: the choice of the hypothesis (Urn A or Urn B)
which is either deterministic or probabilistic;
3. Prior Probability: the prior probability of the hypothesis under con-
sideration (.25, .5, or .75).
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All possible 2× 2× 3 = 12 combinations of the values of these variables
were realized in the experiment. Since the above vignette is quite abstract,
we also set up two other vignettes that are closer to cases of ordinary
reasoning, and repeated the experiment for these vignettes. Example vi-
gnettes, that copy the probabilistic structure of Vignette 1 above, are given
below.
Vignette 2: Again and again, Ruud has knee problems when playing
football. The doctors give him two options: knee surgery or a conser-
vative treatment. If Ruud chooses to go into surgery, he cannot play
football for half a year; if he chooses the conservative treatment, there
is a 33% chance that he can play again after one month; otherwise
(with a chance of 67%) he has to rest longer. You don’t know which
option Ruud chooses, but you believe that the chance that he chooses
surgery is 75%—and that the chance that he chooses the conservative
treatment is 25%. A month later a joint friend tells you that Ruud is
still unable to play football.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Ruud has chosen for the con-
servative treatment.
Vignette 3: Louise arrives by train in Twin City. Twin city has two
districts: West Bank and East Bank. In West Bank, there is only one
taxi company, namely Green Taxi Ltd., and all their cabs are green.
Green Taxi Ltd. also owns 67% of all cabs in East Bank. The other
cabs in East Bank are owned by The Red Taxi Inc., all their cabs are
red. Louise does not know which part of the city the train is entering,
but judging from her knowledge of Twin City she assumes that there
is a 75% chance that she is in West Bank (and a chance of 25% that
she is in East Bank). At some point, Louise sees a green cab from the
train.
Please now consider the hypothesis that Louise is in East Bank.
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Procedure
Participants completed the questionnaire on a university PC or their own
computer in the digital environment of LimeSurvey installed on a local
server. The use of LimeSurvey guaranteed that the data could be protected
and provided with a time stamp and information about the IP address of
the respondent. The experiment was self-paced and took approximately
10 minutes to complete. In total, the experiment thus contained 36 cells,
corresponding to twelve different combinations of the values of the inde-
pendent variables times three different scenarios.
4 Results
Prior to the analysis of the effects of vignette manipulation, we explored
the interdependencies of the seven items in the response questionnaire. To
recall, the participants were asked to judge several aspects of the hypoth-
esis with respect to the evidence: logical implication, causal relevance, ex-
planatory power, increase in understanding, confirmation, posterior prob-
ability and truth. By analyzing the interdependencies with the help of the
Pearson zero-order correlation coefficient, we determined whether the par-
ticipants clearly separate these seven concepts, or whether some of them
can be identified with each other.
The correlations are presented in Table 1. The analysis revealed that
all of the variables correlated at least with .3 with several other variables,
but at most .63. This validates the hypothesis that the participants do not
conflate cognate concepts (e.g., causality, explanatory power) with each
other, which would be reflected in correlation coefficients of greater than
.7. At the same time, the response variables were sufficiently related to
each other to motivate a factor analysis: that is, a decomposition of the
seven response variables into 2-4 constructs that explain together most of
the variation in the data.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Logical Implication - .38 .22 .32 .46 .30 .12
2. Causality - .45 .39 .56 .63 .37
3. Confirmation - .56 .35 .47 .63
4. Post Probability - .37 .51 .46
5. Explan. Power - .60 .28
6. Understanding - .36
7. Truth -
Table 1: Zero-order correlations for 7 items (N = 671), all correlations with
p < .01.
Factor Analysis
The factorability of the 7 items was examined with a Principle Compo-
nent Analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling ade-
quacy was .82 and the Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant (χ2(21)
= 1790.77, p < .0001). The initial eigenvalues showed 51% of variance ex-
plained by the first factor, 16% explained by the second factor, and 10% ex-
plained by the third factor. A visual inspection of the scree plot revealed a
’leveling off’ of eigenvalues after the three factors, therefore, a three factor
solution using the oblique rotation was conducted, with the three factors
explaining 77% of the variance. All items had primary loadings over .7,
viz. Table 2, which presents the factor loading matrix (loadings under .30
suppressed). In the remainder, we will restrict our analysis to these three
factors.
The names for these factors are derived from the clustering that Table
2 indicates. Factor 1, Cognitive Salience, clusters explanatory power to-
gether with cognitive values that are often seen as related, such as causal
coherence and enhancement of understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005;
Strevens 2008). Factor 2, Rational Acceptability, captures those cognitive
values that hang together with the acceptability of a hypothesis: its prob-
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1 2 3 Communality
Logical Implication .94 .94
Causality .86 .74
Confirmation -.84 .77
Post Probability -.72 .67
Explan. Power .81 .73
Understanding .87 .78
Truth -.88 .75
Table 2: Factor loadings and communalities based on a principle compo-
nent analysis with oblimin rotation for 7 items (N = 671).
ability, its confirmation by the evidence, and finally, its truth. The strong
correlations between these values are not surprising: confirmation raises
posterior probability, which is in turn an indicator of the truth of a theory
(e.g., Howson and Urbach 2006). Finally, Factor 3 captures the logical re-
lation between hypothesis and evidence. Since no other response variable
is loaded on this factor, it figures as Entailment, showing the link to the
response variable Logical Implication.1
Tests of Experimental Manipulation
We conducted three analyses of variance (ANOVAs) to test the effects of
the independent variables, Target Hypothesis, Likelihood and Prior Prob-
ability, on Cognitive Salience, Rational Acceptability and Entailment, re-
spectively.2
1The internal consistency for two of the three scales (the third scale only consisted of
one item) was examined using Cronbach’s alpha, resulting in alpha .82 for Factor 1 and
.79 for Factor 2. Composite scores were calculated for each of the three factors using the
mean of the items with primary loadings on each factor. The descriptive values for the
newly constructed scales were M = 3.65, SD = 1.91 for Explanatory Value, M = 3.63, SD =
1.87 for Rational Acceptability, and M = 3.75, SD = 2.40 for Logical Implication.
2A prior analysis of the effect of the vignette on the three dependent variables re-
vealed that Explanatory Value (but not Rational Acceptability and Logical Implication)




High 3.06 (.12) 4.67 (.12)
Low 4.68 (.12) 1.95 (.13)
Table 3: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Explanatory Value by
Target Hypothesis and Likelihood (N = 671).
First, we tested the effects of the experimental manipulation on Cog-
nitive Salience. There was a main effect of Target Hypothesis, F(1, 659) =
21.56, p < .001 ,η2 p = .03, and Likelihood, F(1, 659) = 21.09, p < .001 ,η2 p =
.03 on Cognitive Salience, with no main effect of Prior Probability, F(2, 659)
< 1, p = .82. The significant main effects can only be interpreted in the
light of the interaction effect between Target Hypothesis and Likelihood,
F(1, 659) = 323.65, p < .001 ,η2 p = .33—see Table 3 for the descriptives.
The cognitive salience of the hypothesis was high in two cases: (1)
when the actually observed event was impossible under the alternative
explanation (in other words, when the hypothesis provided the only avail-
able explanation), and (2) when the actually observed event was logically
implied by the candidate explanation. This result confirms the philosoph-
ical thesis that both the epistemic status of the explanans and the expect-
edness of the explanandum under the explanans play an important role
in explanatory reasoning (e.g., Okasha 2000; Lipton 2004; Schupbach and
Sprenger 2011). There were no other significant interaction effects ( F(2,
659) < 1, n.s.).
Target Hypothesis
Likelihood Probabilistic Deterministic
High 3.07 (.10) 3.56 (.10)
Low 5.61 (.10) 1.98 (.11)not included here because the size and direction of the significant main effects and the
interaction effect remained the same when vignette was included as a factor.
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Table 4: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Rational Acceptability
by Target Hypothesis and Likelihood (N = 671).
Second, with respect to Rational Acceptability, there was again a main
effect of Target Hypothesis, F(1, 659) = 234.77, p < .001 ,η2 p = .26, and
Likelihood, F(1, 659) = 21.45, p < .001 ,η2 p = .03, with no main effect of
Prior Probability, F(2, 659) = 1.68, p = .19. There was an interaction ef-
fect between Target Hypothesis and Likelihood, F(1, 659) = 401.09, p <
.001 ,η2 p = .38, see Table 4 for the descriptives. The interaction effect is
easy to explain: The candidate explanation is strongly accepted whenever
the alternative hypothesis is incompatible with the observed evidence.
Conversely, a candidate explanation scores low on this factor when it is
itself incompatible with the observed evidence. The score is rather mid-
dling when the evidence is inconclusive and posteriors are non-extreme, in
agreement with philosophical analyses of rational hypothesis acceptance.
There were no other significant interaction effects ( F(2, 659) <= 1, n.s.).
Target Hypothesis
Likelihood Probabilistic Deterministic
High 3.03 (.15) 5.92 (.15)
Low 3.72 (.15) 2.19 (.16)
Table 5: Estimated Marginal Means and SE of Entailment by Target
Hypothesis and Likelihood(N = 671).
Third and last, we assessed the impact of the experimental manipula-
tions on Entailment. There was a main effect of Target Hypothesis, F(1,
659) = 20.11, p < .001 ,η2 p = .03, and Likelihood, F(1, 659) = 97.93, p <
.001 ,η2 p = .13, with no main effect of Prior Probability, F(2, 659) = 1.23,
p = .29. There was an interaction effect between Target Hypothesis and
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Likelihood, F(1, 659) = 207.11, p < .001 ,η2 p = .24, see Table 5 for the de-
scriptives. Briefly, the response values of Logical Implication respect the
ranking given by the (objective) likelihoods p(E|H), demonstrating the
consistency of the participants with the probabilistic information in the
vignettes. In particular, a logical implication between explanans and ex-
planandum receives the highest value and logical incompatibility receives
the lowest value. There were no other significant interaction effects.
5 Discussion
Overall, the results of our study shows that explanatory value is, as Lom-
brozo (2012, 270) reports, a complex psychological phenomenon related to
several other cognitive processes such as deductive and inductive reason-
ing, causal reasoning, and reasoning about truth. The correlations between
participants’ judgments on individual items suggest that it may be com-
plicated to tease apart the specific roles of these processes in determining
explanatory judgments and making explanatory inferences.
Such a complexity might explain the disagreement about existing
philosophical accounts of scientific explanation. Each of the three most
prominent philosophical accounts of explanation attempts to explicate the
concept of scientific explanation by focusing on a particular aspect of ex-
planatory value. Hempel (1965) ties explanatory value to derivability, on
the grounds that for a hypothesis to successfully explain an explanan-
dum, the explanandum must be a logical consequence of the explanans.
Schupbach and Sprenger (2011) and Crupi and Tentori (2012) generalize
Hempel’s account to making the explanandum more expected (instead
of deriving it), and they use probabilistic relevance relations for spelling
out explanatory value. According to causal-mechanical accounts such as
Salmon (1971/84), Woodward (2003), and Strevens (2008), explanatory
value lies in the identification of causal mechanisms. For unificationist
models such as Friedman (1974) and Kitcher (1981), explanatory value is
a matter of providing a unified account of a range of different phenomena
that could yield understanding. If explanatory value is indeed a complex
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psychological phenomenon, and insofar as these accounts aim to capture
the value of explanation, it is not surprising that disagreements about the
correct account of explanation will persist, and that explanatory value can-
not be mapped neatly on one of these accounts.
In the light of this diversity, a rapprochement between competing the-
ories of scientific explanation seems desirable. The goal of a philosophical
account of explanation should be to capture the complexity of explanatory
value. Precisely characterizing the heterogeneity of explanatory judgment,
isolating the factors and processes that contribute to the assessment of a
potentially explanatory hypothesis, is thus an important direction for fu-
ture research in psychology as well as in philosophy and epistemology of
science.
Three more specific conclusions can be drawn from the results of our
study.
First, our factor analysis separated the items “causality”, “understand-
ing” and “explanatory power” (→ Cognitive Salience) from the items
“confirmation”, “posterior probability”, “truth” (→ Rational Acceptabil-
ity) and “logical implication” (→ Entailment). This corresponds to three
types of factors that figure in philosophical accounts of explanatory rea-
soning: cognitive, logical and probabilistic relations. On the one hand,
this finding substantiates previous results that indicated the existence of
a tight connection between explanatory power, causality and a sense of
understanding (Lipton 2004; Keil 2006; Lombrozo 2007; Trout 2007). On
the other hand, the finding indicates that folk reasoning about potential
explanations can neatly distinguish between the concepts of Rational Ac-
ceptability and Cognitive Salience of a hypothesis. This suggests that the
explanatory value attributed to a hypothesis need not indicate its accept-
ability, spelling trouble for IBE.
Second, participants’ judgments on the three main factors we
identified—Cognitive Salience, Rational Acceptability and Logical
Implication—were strongly affected by changes in explicit probabilistic
information. Hence, explanatory reasoning is not only bound up with
causal mechanisms: it is heavily affected by logical and probabilistic rela-
17
tions between hypothesis and evidence. In other words, our results sug-
gests that probabilistic reasoning might be a crucial ingredient of explana-
tory inferences—at least in situations, such as our vignettes, where there
is a limited set of competing explanations. Future research may investi-
gate whether this result stays robust if we extend the type of vignettes to
scenarios where more explicit causal mechanisms are given, and where
a potentially unlimited number of hypotheses compete for being the best
explanation. In the light of the strong link between causal and explanatory
judgments, it also seems promising to explore a dual model of explanatory
reasoning, e.g., a model where a judgment on explanatory power com-
bines the plausibility of a causal mechanism with probabilistic relevance
for the phenomenon of interest.
Third, the compatibilist research program about IBE and probabilis-
tic inference is not supported by our findings. The concepts of posterior
probability, degree of confirmation and truth, that all relate to the rational
acceptability of the explanans, cluster together, but they are quite remote
from explanatory power. Attributions of explanatory value to a hypothe-
sis often diverge from the acceptability of the hypothesis. This poses an
important challenge for those who defend explications of IBE according to
which explanatory value is a reliable guide to truth. Broader applications
in philosophy of science abound. For example, arguments for scientific
realism often postulate a link between explanation and truth, where the
truth of our best scientific theories is supported by the observation that it
is the best explanation for the success of science (Boyd 1983; Psillos 1999).
All this does not rule out that Inference to the Best Explanation may,
under favorable circumstances, be a good heuristic for Bayesian inference,
and that participants use it in some of these cases. In fact, our study is
silent on this latter issue. It just demonstrates that sound probabilistic
inference and explanatory power are quite different concepts, and that
subjects recognize this difference.
To sum up, our results demonstrate that probabilistic reasoning is an
important part of explanatory inferences. Overall, we see that for a proper
understanding of explanatory reasoning, it is essential to investigate the
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precise relationship between explanatory power and other cognitive val-
ues, as well as the subtle relationship between explanatory value and prob-
abilistic inference. These topics have been relatively neglected in the psy-
chological and philosophical literature. With our study, we hope to make
a small step forward toward a genuinely pluralistic and naturalized phi-
losophy of explanation.
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